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«Por otra parte, estamos en el siglo XXI y España y Francia ya no son lo
que eran en 1939, ya no hay pesetas ni francos, ni siquiera hay frontera entre
los dos países (...). Lo más sencillo hubiera sido desconectar el móvil, ignorar
microondas y vibraciones de la modernidad y regresar la montaña a su estado
original, pero resulta que el teléfono, además de ser un trasto molesto que
obstaculizaba mi experiencia, era el indicador de la frontera entre los dos
países. De un lado operaba una compañía telefónica, y del otro, otra, y cada
vez que, en mi camino levemente errático por la cima, cruzaba la línea virtual
que divide España de Francia, mi incursión se registraba en la pantalla del
teléfono, que cambiaba de Movistar a Bouygtel.»
From Jordi Soler (2009), La Fiesta del Oso, Literatura Mondadori.
Abstract
The liberalization of telecommunications and technological change have unbundled a vector of
public interventions in this industry. Now different government levels interact. The economics of
federalism shed light into this new landscape. The insights from this branch of research are used to
analyze the European Union common telecommunications policy (as compared to the history of federal
and state regulations in the US) and the role of local and regional powers in the promotion of
broadband new generation networks. Decentralized non-specialized policies internalize policy
externalities, whereas specialized centralized authority internalizes territorial spillovers. Preliminary
empirical evidence shows that decentralization of policies inside member states is not detrimental for
broadband investment in the European Union.
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Resumen
La liberalización de las telecomunicaciones y los cambios tecnológicos han dado lugar a un nuevo
vector desagregado de intervenciones públicas en este sector. Dado que en la regulación ahora participan
distintos niveles de gobierno, el análisis económico del federalismo puede aportar ideas a este nuevo
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escenario. Las herramientas de este área de investigación son utilizadas en este trabajo para analizar la
política común de telecomunicaciones de la Unión Europea (en comparación con la historia de las
regulaciones federal y estatal en los Estados Unidos), así como también el papel de los poderes locales y
regionales en la promoción de las redes de nueva generación. Las políticas no especializadas y
descentralizadas intenalizan las externalidades que se producen en la interacción de políticas públicas,
mientras que las autoridades especializadas y centralizadas internalizan los efectos desbordamiento entre
territorios. Alguna evidencia empírica preliminar señala que la descentralización de las políticas dentro
de los Estados miembros no perjudica a las inversiones en banda ancha en la UE.
Palabras clave: federalismo, regulación, telecomunicaciones.
Clasificación JEL: H77, K23, L50, L94, L96, L97.
1. Introducción
Decisions about the optimal allocation of responsibilities on telecommunications
in the vertical chain of government face an old dilemma between scale economies
and network externalities, on the one hand, and management of rights of way, on the
other. Whereas the optimal scale of a telecommunications network can be very large,
its deployment naturally needs the involvement of local powers. 
In addition to this old dilemma, in the last two or three decades the liberalization
of telecommunications and technological change have unbundled a vector of public
interventions in this industry. Different elements of this vector (competition policy,
regulation of residual monopolies, public investment) have different geographic
scope. Prior to these phenomena, all public intervention took place over many decades
through the national regulation or public ownership of vertically integrated
monopolies. Now different government levels interact. In this article, the implications
of this interaction are analyzed. To do it, the relevant literature is summarized; also,
the evolution of jurisdictional allocation in the EU and the US and the particular case
of Internet broadband policies are addressed. It will be seen that the effects of different
policy allocations and the criteria to choose among them have to do, among other
issues such as «laboratory federalism,» with different types of externalities. 
In particular, it is argued below that there is a trade-off between the different
spillovers internalized by each level of government: centralization internalizes
territorial spillovers, and decentralization better internalizes policy spillovers. As a
result, an empirical prediction is that the impact of decentralization on network
extension is ambiguous. Preliminary evidence shown in Section 4 does not solve
this ambiguity but provides weak results in favour of some role for local and
regional powers.
The issue of the optimal degree and form of decentralization of public
intervention must be addressed coinciding with liberalization and technological
change in telecommunications. However, the debate about the optimal degree of
centralization in telecommunications policies precedes the advent of liberalization.
There is a well documented historical trend by which the regulation of utilities
moved up in the vertical chain of government, starting at the beginning of the XXth
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century from the local to the state level in the US1 and other jurisdictions2.
However, significant intervention still persists at the local level, as illustrated by the
role of municipal powers in broadband promotion. Decentralized powers are under
significant pressure to intervene in regulated network industries, at least for three
reasons (see Troesken, 1996):
ii(i) the physical deployment of networks depends on the rights of way for which
local powers are often naturally responsible;
i(ii) regulatory policies are locally salient, and
(iii) interest groups find it relatively easy at the local level to organize to
influence these policies in a variety of directions.
Liberalization certainly adds a further layer of complexity relative to monopoly
regulation. As some authors have characterized the liberalization process in network
industries as a «long and winding road»3, no minor ingredient of such conditions is
the relationship between the different government levels. If anything, the
introduction of competition increases institutional diversity (see Moore, 2002). 
A consequence of complexity is that the organization of government may not
always coincide with market boundaries or with the boundaries of firms. As Woroch
(1990) argues, «when multiple regulators are unavoidable, boundaries between them
should divide areas and services that exhibit low cross-elasticities of demand and
supply. Such «bright lines» have become less attainable with recent developments
in telephony.» And «how governments divide up the industrial landscape may be
vastly different from how business choose to organize.» 
The relationship between regulation and investment is another key aspect of the
debate. For example some commentators argue that too much regulatory diversity
discourages investment because it introduces costs related to red tape and
uncertainty4. But others argue that decentralization introduces a variety of veto
points which stop the predatory tendencies of government and restricts the
information and authority available to central powers, thereby contributing to
reinforce commitment (not to expropriate investments). 
However, decentralization as an attempt to reduce the role of state intervention
(as advocated in the Reagan era in the US) may have the problem of reducing the
scope for good as well as for bad policies: as is well known in the literature on
reform in developing countries, the further veto points contributed by
decentralization favour the status quo. This may be good if the status quo implies
preserving the value of good investments, but it may be bad if the status quo implies
1 See TROESKEN (1996), HAUSMAN and NEUFELD (1991, 1999, 2004), NEUFELD (2008).
2 Although in most other jurisdictions, the move to the national-state level involved the creation
of state owned and (moslty, although not universally, especially in electricity) national vertically
integrated firms.
3 ARMSTRONG and SAPPINGTON (2006).
4 On the compliance costs of overlapping or duplicated regulation, see mentions to it by
KOVACIC (2007) and SPECTOR (2007).
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stopping a potentially welfare increasing market expansion or liberalization process.
Both the new political economy of federalism and the experience of US electricity
suggest that decentralization (at the state or member state level) is better at
providing commitment for investment than at accommodating market reforms.
As it has been argued above, the arguments of the telecommunications policy
vector are not controlled by a single body any longer. The need for vertical and
horizontal cooperation then arises, but cooperation may be inhibited by
distributional concerns (Baron, 1985). For example, industrial policies that interact
with broadband markets are not always decided at the same jurisdictional level as
regulatory decisions on market power. 
For example, different authorities may control behavioural and structural
regulation (which are clearly interdependent), as illustrated in Gilbert and Riordan
(1995) or Perry (1984). According to Joskow (2009) the federal electricity regulator in
the US has been constrained to use behavioural instruments to control market power
in wholesale markets when it would have been optimal to use structural instruments,
for which it does not have jurisdiction. The starting point of deregulation is
characterized by geographical fragmentation and typically member states in the EU,
as states in the US, are free riders in the path to competition: they would benefit from
more integrated and competitive markets in the long run, but do not want to lose the
lever they have on territorial incumbents to both maintain or promote national
champions and use regulated cash flow to promote a number of local objectives.
The degree and nature of the involvement of each level of government are of great
importance to telecommunications firms, which have intensely lobbied for the approval
of the third package with the argument that increased regulatory harmonization and
market integration will reduce the costs of European wide operators.
This paper first explores in Section 2 how the literature on federalism can
contribute to the reform of the telecommunications industry. Next, in Section 3, it
analyzes the architecture of telecommunications regulation in the European Union
as compared to the US. Section 4 addresses the interaction between the degree of
decentralization and the performance of broadband Internet access. Finally, Section
5 presents some concluding remarks.
2. Telecommunications and the economics of federalism
The main arguments used in the literature on the economics of federalism5 are
applicable to network industries in general and to telecommunications in particular,
as argued by Trillas (2008b). The Tiebout (1956) argument that jurisdictional
competition may under strong conditions select optimal differentiated policies under
factor mobility was strengthened and applied to commitment for private investment
5 As summarized for example in OATES (1999). This author has developed the theory behind the
subsidiarity argument, by which central powers should carry the burden of the proof in case of doubt,
because local powers are expected to have a tailoring and information advantage.
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by the market preserving theory of Weingast and his co-authors6. Treisman (2007,
p. 97) mentions casual evidence that public utilities infrastructure and local airports
have been used by local authorities to compete for mobile capital.
Table 1 organizes the literature along three dimensions. First generation
arguments were those made before the irruption of contract theory. Those arguments
in italics have to do with the structural conditions of markets, which have the virtue
of providing a clearer guide than other sorts of arguments. It can also be seen from
the table that more recent arguments have delivered more ambiguous conclusions.
Accountability, capture7 and commitment are important issues to take into account
in specific settings, but in general both theory and empirical evidence show that they
do not settle the issue of centralization versus decentralization (see Trillas, 2008b).
Yilmaz et al., (2002) report statistical evidence that US states use regulation and
policies to encourage telecommunications investment which has a significant
impact on the attraction of mobile factors. Indeed, it is precisely telecommunications
technologies that make business more mobile than in the past. An increase in the
telecommunications investment levels in all states has even a small but negative
externality on the economic growth of any single state due to loss of mobile factors
to other states. Regulatory competition may also unleash undesirable phenomena
such as a «race to the bottom» or «beggar thy neighbour» policies, for example in
telecommunications high termination rates for calls originated in other countries or
states. Laboratory federalism (letting local powers perform experiments in the face
of uncertainty) and tailoring arguments can also be used to defend a role for local
powers, although high inter-jurisdictional externalities, coordination and scale
economies (at the product or administrative level) would tilt the balance in favour
of central powers.
6 See for example QIAN and WEINGAST (1997).
7 See BARDHAN and MOOKHERJEE (1999, 2006).
TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Favours Central Favours Local AmbiguousRegulation Regulation
– Externalities and scale – Laboratory federalism – Market definition
First Generation
– Coordination – Tailoring – Special districts
– Race to the bottom – Regulatory Competition
– Beggar thy neighbour
– Quasi-rents – Market preserving – Accountability
Second Generation – Compliance costs – federalism – Capture
– Regulatory capacity – Political participation – Commitment
NOTE: In italics, arguments related to structural market conditions. First and second generation refer to arguments
before and after the introduction of contract theory in economics.
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Some scholars8 argue that liberalization requires a centralization of regulatory
authority at the central, federal level, to overcome the resistance of local regulators
that put incumbent or other interests above the goal of market efficiency. This would
be compatible with a withdrawal of federal regulation at a later stage when the
progress of liberalization is deemed sufficient (one wonders why these scholars have
trust in the disappearance of the federal regulator but not the disappearance of the
national/local one). However, the control of rights of way and political sensitivity at
the positive level make national or regional/local participation to some extent
unavoidable. Different jurisdictions will control different parts of the multi-
dimensional policy vector that affects liberalizing sectors. Optimal modularity (fine-
tuned unbundling of firms and regulatory responsibilities) decisions are often
difficult to make or enforce in complementary and rapidly changing markets. This
makes vertical cooperation a necessary attribute of a sound regulatory system (as
suggested by Nuechterlein and Weiser, 2007), and that type of cooperation has been
a key feature of EU telecommunications in the recent past.
Although geographic market definition in the sense used by competition policy
could in theory be used as a criterion to choose the optimal regulatory jurisdiction,
the fact is that often the boundaries of markets do no coincide with the boundaries
of political jurisdictions. Under some specific conditions, it is worth going beyond
traditional political boundaries and organize regulation through special districts9,
such as PJM or the NordPool wholesale market organizations in the case of
electricity. But the fixed administrative costs of creating a new institution can be
high (see Subsection 4.2 below on the fixed administrative costs of regulation).
Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) argue that the allocation of policies should not only
depend on efficiency criteria, but also on the objective of promoting political
participation. This would justify local policies that do not necessarily promote
economic efficiency if they are approved under desirable levels of participation and
transparency. Troesken (1996) and Neufeld (2008) argue that a key factor in moving
regulation from the local to the state level was the inability of local powers to
commit to acceptable rates of return for private investors. Nonnenmacher (2001)
however argues that in the diffusion of the state regulation of the telegraph industry
a cycle characterized by promotion followed by regulation was more important than
quasi-rents considerations.
The argument that centralization is the only way in liberalizing telecommuni-
cations markets is strongly made by Hoffinger (2003), Hahn et al. (2003), Lehr and
Kiessling (1998), and Sun and Pelkmans (1995). Following these authors, federal
regulation in telecommunications should be strengthened and should focus on those
aspects that amount to clear externalities, for example:
8 JOSKOW (2009), LEHR and KIESSLING (1999), SUN and PELKMANS (1995), HAHN et al.,
(2003), HOFFINGER (2003).
9 On the virtues of special districts, see EICHENBERGER and FREY (2006) and CASELLA and
FREY (1992). Other examples are schools or water districts in the US.
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iii) «beggar thy neighbour» policies in roaming wholesale termination charges
(but keeping a balance that avoids, in Europe for example, precluding
European-wide commercial initiatives by companies to reduce retail roaming
rates); 
iii) any policies that cause what Sun and Pelkmans (1995) call the «frontier
effect»10, namely the fact that equally costly products or services are more
expensive when they cross a jurisdictional border than when they take place
inside the borders of a member state; more generally, legal barriers to entry
should be eliminated, and only structural barriers to entry should prevail in
the long run, which implies helping to integrate those markets that are only
stopped by legal separate jurisdictions;
iii) protectionist terms of access or licensing policies that entrench the position
of national incumbents or are equivalent to state aid in the promotion of the
international competitiveness of national incumbents. Credible entrants are
typically foreign incumbents and the temptation to embark into subtle ways
to promote the national ones are often hard to stop under conventional checks
against state aid.
Without taking such a strong view, other scholars add telecommunications into
lists of industries that should be regulated at the national as opposed to regional or
local level (Aubert and Laffont, 2002, and Smith, 2000). But see Nuechterlein and
Weiser (2007) for the view that an input from all levels may be needed in modern
telecommunications markets (central powers may be overwhelmed by local problems
or lack the necessary information). Brennan (2003), analyzing disputes over local
authorities in the US imposing open access conditions on cable companies’ mergers,
argues that local authorities should be left free to choose on local markets, even if
they decide erroneously, along the lines of Inman and Rubinfeld (1997). His only
caveat follows the arguments of Troesken (1996), in the sense that there is a risk that
local powers hold up private operators, and stresses that this is especially so when
these operators may be earning rents at the national level. In this case, the local hold
up risk imposes a negative externality on the rest of the country. Brennan (2003)
however stresses that in local access issues the relevant markets are local, not
national: «The issue at hand is not agreeing to a standard Internet protocol, but one
of the structure of the local ISP market. Local officials presumably are both closer to
the affected consumers and more knowledgeable regarding relevant market
conditions than is the federal government. To the extent that the policy is based on
alleviating problems created by monopolies in relevant markets, the policy choice
and the risk of error should be a local prerogative, unless a wrong local choice will
substantially reduce the value of Internet access elsewhere in the country.»
The network in one jurisdiction may have higher value to consumers when the
neighbouring jurisdiction has a better network. These spillovers are of two types:
10 See the quote at the beginning of the paper.
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– Direct externalities: individuals of country A benefit if a good network in the
neighbouring country B allows them to contact more people, firms or
organizations in this country.
– Indirect externalities: individuals of country A benefit if a good network in the
neighbouring country B creates incentives for the development of enhanced
applications which require a large market.
Humplick and Estache (1995) look at the impact of different measures of
decentralization on the performance of road investment, electricity and water11,
without clear cut results. In the case of electricity they use a dummy variable for
spatial decentralization for a cross section of countries, without giving many details
on how this variable is computed (e.g., does it mean that all relevant legislation and
tariffs are at sub-central levels). Beyond this, there is no more systematic empirical
work to my knowledge on the impact of the jurisdictional allocation of regulation in
network industries.
The definition of the relevant market in telecommunications is similar to what is
done in other industries, and it depends on the degree of substitutability between
products and between the same product sold in different places. But some scholars12
highlight the specific risk in telecommunications that, with too narrow product
definitions, the fast technological and demand convergence process is not duly taken
into account. This would imply that often some concentration levels are being
diagnosed, which are false if one takes a broader relevant product market definition.
This broader market definition would tend to diminish the importance of
opportunities to practice horizontal or vertical product differentiation. Market power
can artificially arise if markets are defined too narrowly. The trend in geographic
markets is however the opposite: it is precisely due to technological reasons that
some territories can accept higher concentration levels than others, and therefore the
geographic definition could yield smaller markets than those that have been deemed
relevant in the past. 
Public intervention in telecommunications is mostly justified by market power
concerns and the presence of territorial externalities. This implies that not all socially
desirable projects are commercially viable, although the exact location of the region
of socially desirable and commecially unfeasible projects is hard to identify. 
Alongside direct and indirect externalities mentioned above, there are also
externalities due to the social welfare or the economic growth generated by the
development of businesses allowed by enhanced telecommunications networks, by
some medical and educational applications, etc. Nevertheless, the location of this
enhanced welfare is uncertain. 
11 In the case of electricity, performance is measured in terms of system losses, customers served
per employee, generation capacity factor, rate of return on investment, and employees per Gigawatt-
hour produced. 
12 See GUAL (2007).
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Direct and indirect externalities are territorial spillovers because they are
associated to the notion that the larger the network, the better. The third type of
externalities just mentioned is not necessarily related to territorial spillovers, but
may benefit form coordination with policies in other fields (such as health or
education). Hence, externalities of this type may be called «policy externalities».
This distinction will play an important role in Section 4.
The role of governments in promoting some projects in telecommunications and
the goals of universal service policies can be justified with this lens, although equity
concerns, or merit goods considerations may also play a role.
To conclude this section, two possible policies are mentioned that have been
thought in the recent past to reduce the cost of deployment of telecommunications
networks in general and broadband new generation networks in particular. These
two policies are network sharing and geographic differentiation of regulation, and
both suggest a role for local powers in the context of a coordinated strategy with
other jurisdictions. Network sharing is a quintessential instance in which
government, through a thoughful policy of expediting access to public and private
rights of way and ducts, can assist private parties in overcoming a collective action
problem. Geographic differentiation consist of dividing a jurisdiction in competitive
and non competitive areas, and promote facilities based competition only in those
areas that are more competitive. One country that has seemed to take seriously into
account geographic differentiation thus far is Canada (see Trillas, 2008a). Important
practical concerns with it are the difficulties of establishing the correct boundaries
between regions. There is a trade-off between practicality and granularity. In the
Canadian approach, as a first step, metropolitan areas are separated from the rest of
the country and regulation and other policies are confined to the non metropolitan
areas. Then it is expected that local and regional authorities have a larger role in
these non metropolitan areas. OECD (2010) contains several other examples of
geographically differentiated regulation in France, Australia and other jurisdictions.
3. Telecommunications regulatory architecture in the EU and the US
European Union
The reform of network industries in Europe tries to liberalize and at the same
time fix the right location of policy in the vertical structure of government. Industry
reform changes the boundaries between markets and regulation, and also the
boundaries between regulatory jurisdictions. EU regulatory frameworks set out
objectives and rules for national regulators and governments, whilst granting them
flexibility in certain areas to apply the rules in the light of national conditions. 
For decades, the telecommunications markets in Europe were mostly based on
publicly owned vertically integrated national monopolies. The telecommunications
sector was not a concern for the European authorities until the 1980s, where a Green
Paper expressed concern over the lack of competition in these markets and the
potential role that a better functioning telecommunications sector could play in
enhancing the economic dynamism of the region. The European Commission led the
liberalization wave of the nineties, which was accompanied by (to different degrees)
privatization of national incumbents13. With a similar timing as in electricity, the
first two packages of directives tried to progressively introduce competition in
national markets and at the same time increase the role of the European Commission
in overseeing these markets in a piece-meal way (Seabright, 1998). The first
Telecommunications package set a timetable for the liberalization of national
markets, including provisions for open access and the removal of cross-subsidies.
The second package included a detailed procedure for the analysis of each of the 18
identified markets in the sector. According to this procedure, the national regulatory
authorities had to analyze these markets14 and determine (under the agreement of
the European Commission) whether there was significant market power in each of
these markets. If it was determined that market power was significant, the national
authority had discretion to introduce ex ante regulatory remedies. Under the second
package, nothing prevented the member states from adopting different remedies to
similar problems.
The first two packages combined implied more harmonization (clearly useful for
technical standards) than market integration. Gual and Jodar (2007) provide a useful
summary of the results achieved under the current system.
Partial harmonization was promoted under the argument that regulatory
inconsistencies are a major entry barrier for companies that want to operate in
several countries. A reasonable framework was set for vertical cooperation between
EU authorities and national authorities, with yardstick regulatory competition
(benchmark reports), balancing harmonization to reduce entry barriers (and to
prevent uneven competition) with knowledge of local conditions: what is called
«host country rule within limits» (Gual, 2007; according to this author however
«results have been fairly limited so far»). Many of the harmonization rules have
gone in the direction of opening the local loop and promoting the «ladder of
investment theory,» to ensure that national rules did not protect local incumbents. 
The third package approved in 2009 includes the following new features:
– Fewer markets are presumed to need ex ante regulation (with focus on
wholesale markets), but an EC role is introduced in the determination of
remedies when market analysis determines the existence of significant market
power.
– Creation of a European Market Authority. This is a body of national regulatory
authorities called precisely Body of European Regulators for Electronic
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13 Privatization has never been required by EU directives. Indeed, the Treaty of Rome would
forbid any such EU legislative obligation.
14 National authorities must also determine the geographic market definition, but routinely decide
in almost all cases that markets are national.
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Communications (BEREC). It has an advisory role, focused on transnational
markets, harmonisation and cross-border disputes.
– Focus on spectrum liberalization and other potential European-wide service
markets.
According to Seabright (1998), it is not straightforward to separate those
regulatory issues that involve significant cross-border externalities because of
economies of scope between types of service (e.g., local and long distance calls).
The result is that the EU assumes powers piecemeal, as member states are willing to
concede them, and on the basis of a generalized dissatisfaction with progress
towards some (usually vaguely specified) notion of an ideal single market rather
than a coherent application of the rules of subsidiarity. 
The specific technological requirements of telecommunications, plus the
possibility of significant network externalities, have led some to argue that
centralization at the EU level is the only way to regulate this sector reasonably
efficiently. Whatever the truth of this argument, similar piecemeal processes in other
sectors in the past have sometimes led to assignments of power to the EU that look
hard to justify according to any such principles (such as in the Common Agricultural
Policy). 
It is difficult to argue that the central policy should be the only game in town due
to generic network externalities, because, at least for voice telephony markets,
universal service has been achieved. In those markets where the full population is
not covered, such as broadband, it is hard to argue that network externalities in the
sense of extending the service will be better served by European agencies than by
well targeted local initiatives.
The product markets that national and European authorities must in practice
jointly analyze would benefit from undergoing a more sophisticated analysis of
geographic market definition, which should take into account not only the current
legal conditions, but also the optimal legal conditions that should leave in place only
those barriers that are due to technology and consumer preferences (in a similar way
to the literature on optimal currency areas in monetary policy, but applied to all
product markets, because different product markets may have different optimal
geographic sizes).
The division between local and central is less precise because of changing and
converging technologies. In telecommunications, those segments that are typically
supra-national are competitive in nature, and so should be the object of less intrusive
and ex-ante regulation. It is somehow paradoxical that as liberalization progresses,
the supra-national regulatory authorities take more responsibility on the ex-ante
regulation of less competitive segments that are usually structurally local, and that
also are progressively being opened up to competition. Besides the possible
inconsistencies from the point of view of the economics of federalism, the ex ante
regulatory rules to enforce local regulation (which contrast with an orientation
towards facilities based competition in the US) may be targeted at preventing
regulatory inconsistencies across countries which could act as a barrier to entry and
to cross-border investment and competition. Commission interventions on mobile
roaming and other cross-border charges, show that the particular features of the
harmonisation being imposed is perhaps enforcing a ‘managed competition’
outcome with possible adverse consequences for longer run innovation and
competition.
In this context, it may be interesting to ask what are the consequences for future
investments in telecommunications, and in next generation broadband in particular,
of reinforcing a European regulatory authority. It could be thought that, as the
decision to create the European Central Bank fixed with a single decision the
problem of geographic market integration in monetary policy and the problem of
strategic delegation, something similar could be done in telecommunications.
However, neither the legal status of the new body of European regulators is as strong
as the one of the European Central Bank, nor its responsibilities are as important.
The European Commission and the national governments can still be considered the
main regulators, and in practice the new regulatory body has mostly an advisory
role. Whereas the horizontal cooperation between national regulators is necessary,
the marginal benefit of an independent body beyond the regulatory role of the
European Commission (a multi-partisan and multi-country executive body) is
questionable. If the largest efficiency gains must come from market integration and
the resistance to this integration is mainly political, perhaps the Commission should
focus on trying politically to overcome such resistance - as it has done to overcome
the national resistance to competition policy through the political leadership of
Commissioners Brittan, Monti and Kroes, for example. Bernstein (1955) suggested
a long time ago that one of the disadvantages of independent regulators is their built-
in isolation from the political process, which incapacitates them from leading
necessary but resisted reforms.
The final result of the third package is far from achieving the market integration
level of the US, where after a process of industry consolidation a limited number of
firms compete nationally in TV, fixed and mobile telephony and broadband Internet
access. We now turn to the US experience.
United States
Starting with New York and Wisconsin in 1907, state Public Utility Commissions
(PUCs) regulated telephone services before any federal intervention. Federal
regulation of the telephone industry began in 1913 with the so called Kingsbury
commitment, an agreement by the AT&T and the federal government that the
industry would be a regulated monopoly, initially regulated by the Interstate
Commerce Commission and after 1934 by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC). For the half century between the 1934 Telecommunications Act
and the divestiture of ATT in the 1980s, there was a neat and basically non
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problematic separation of jurisdiction between the states (intrastate tariffs) and FCC
(interstate tariffs). Controversies increased in telecommunications with the
introduction of competition first in long distance and in the nineties in local
competition, especially as they affected common costs and access to infrastructure.
In general, the FCC over this process pushed for deregulation and competition,
while the states resisted the process or tried to micro-manage it to avoid losing the
redistribution powers of the old regulatory system. A merger wave has accompanied
the whole reform of the last years: the Bell regional companies have consolidated
and vertically re-integrated. The Federal Communications Commission gained new
powers relative to states jurisdiction as a result of the 1996 Telecommunications Act,
which left many aspects to be filled. Specifically, it was the agency in charge of
authorizing the local companies entry in long distance, and it fixed the criteria for
wholesale prices of local telephony, which were finally fixed by the states following
these criteria. In wireless telecommunications, prior to 1993, states had the power to
regulate prices and terms of service. The potential for competition was limited
because the Federal Communications Commission had assigned radio spectrum for
cellular communications to just two providers in each locality, one of which was the
old Bell operating company. It was a clear example of federal structural regulation
and state behavioral regulation. But under the umbrella of an Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Washington preempted state authority over rate and
entry regulation in mobile telephony. The addition of more spectrum allocated
through federally organized auctions along with technological improvements
facilitated the assembly of six national service networks (some of which
subsequently consolidated through mergers, but still leaving most US citizens with
a choice of more than three cellular networks). Washington did leave states some
authority to regulate mobile phone service under the general rubric of consumer
protection. Some states have controversially used this authority, for example
California in its Telecommunications Bill of Rights, which limits phone service
providers’ discretion in a wide range of activities, with the focus on disclosure of
contract terms and redress in cases in which customers are not satisfied with service.
Hahn el al., (2003) argue that the potential costs for the operators of these
requirements imply that they «skate dangerously close to affecting wireless rates
and terms -an area not covered by state regulation.» They also make an interesting
use of the arguments of externalities and capital mobility against decentralized
intervention:
«The mobile communications industry, in ironic contrast to the people who use
it, is not mobile. Providers of national service have a considerable stake in a strong
presence in every state. Thus, while a state regulatory climate may affect the pace of
local investment, one cannot depend on wireless communications providers facing
onerous state rules to vote with their feet.»
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It is not clear the extent to which the states lost regulatory jurisdiction as a result
of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. Local retail telephone rates, intrastate long-
distance rates, carrier connection rates, and even high-speed business rates are still
highly regulated in most states. There is a long list of issues on which the states still
have jurisdiction according to the Act, although one important piece of state
regulation was preempted by the Act: the decision on local entry in
telecommunications. Local powers (municipalities and counties) also kept
jurisdiction on franchise conditions for Cable firms, although they had already lost
the responsibility of setting prices. Brennan (2003) argues that they should keep,
through these franchise conditions, the ability to decide on open access for Internet
Service Providers on the grounds that the involved markets are local and there are
no relevant spillovers on the decision that one local jurisdiction takes. He adds the
caveats that the decisions on open access or otherwise should be made separate from
trying to use franchises to interfere with merger decisions, in order to avoid the hold
up problem of a locality trying to capture the efficiency rents from a large,
potentially national merger; and that the decisions on open access should not be used
to ask the operators for in-kind compensations such as free institutional channels or
other initiatives that have an impact on fiscal issues.
The telecommunications companies started to provide video services competing
with cable in the 2000s, and asked the FCC and Congress to pass national rules
exempting them from local franchise conditions15, on the argument that it would be
too costly to negotiate with thousands of local authorities when there are scale
economies in setting a programming platform and launching service at the national
level. Some states such as Texas in 2005 gave these companies the relief that they
were seeking at the national level.
Nuechterlein and Weiser (2007) interpret the evolution of telecommunications in
the US after the 1996 Telecommunications Act as a (largely failed) exercise in
cooperative federalism between the FCC and the states16. In the 1996 Act, the FCC
reserved for itself the right to validate the check list of conditions for the local
incumbents to have their quarantines ended; the FCC created a federal universal
service fund to cope with the unsustainability of cross-subsidies as a result of
competition in selected segments (cherry-picking). Interestingly, they characterize
two distinct periods in terms of the relationship between the FCC and the states:
1) Since the 1934 Communications Act until the Telecommunications Act of
1996, the system can be characterized as one mainly of dual jurisdiction: the
FCC in charge of interstate issues, the states in charge of intrastate issues. This
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15 NUECHTERLEIN and WEISER (2007, p. xxiii): «Since the dawn of cable television several
decades ago, the states and thousands of local governments have played a critical role in deciding the
terms on which cable companies can use public rights of way to provide multi-channel video services
to end users.»
16 See also DIXON and WEISER (2006).
did not exclude some areas of cooperative federalism, as in the Joint Board
that decided somehow arbitrarily that the proportion of joint costs that should
be allocated to long distance interstate calls should be exactly 25%.
2) After 1996, the FCC and the states engaged more strongly in cooperative
federalism in deciding the terms under which local telecommunications
entrants should share the infrastructure of incumbents: the FCC would fix the
rules under which these infrastructures would be used, and the states would
implement these rules deciding the exact level of access charges. However, the
dual jurisdiction model was kept in retail prices, by maintaining the
jurisdiction of state commissions to fix local retail prices. Soon after the Act,
the Supreme Court asserted the FCC jurisdiction in unbundling policies in the
Iowa Utilities Board case, but after that a number of judicial decisions have
much narrowed down the scope of unbundling requirements and the
jurisdiction about them both by the FCC and the states.
According to NRRI (http://nrri.org), the research institute of public utility
commissions, state utility commissions currently have a reduced role in
telecommunications. In a call for research projects in their web page, they argue that
«The portion of the industry subject to their jurisdiction has declined, as has their
legal authority in many states. Whereas the regulator of 1980 needed skills to
conduct cost-of-service cases, today those skills are much less relevant. More
relevant skills today may be the ability to test for market power or to identify dated
regulations that are doing more harm than good. The state commissioner’s job is
made more difficult because the FCC in many cases fails to give clear guidance. In
some areas the FCC claims jurisdiction, but its follow through is not thorough. This
leaves states uncertain of whether to involve themselves in problems that concern
their local constituents but that may exceed state jurisdiction.» Weiser (2001 and
2003) defends a role for the states in supplementing FCC efforts or minimum
standards, in a similar way as environmental regulation established since the 1970s,
based on arguments of local tayloring and experimentation; he argues that the role
in arbitrating disputes gives the states «a key role in superintending» the federal
regulatory program, and at the same time reorients the mission of regulators and
courts from one of protecting end-users to one of arbitrating disputes among rival
providers, and, in particular, overseeing access to and pricing of bottleneck
facilities; he also argues that the states role should be constrained, beyond the floors
established by the FCC and federal legislation, in the sense that they should
implement federal and not other objectives; he mentions the Erie and Chevron
doctrines, after two landmark judicial cases, according to which regulatory
uniformity should be of less concern relative to experimentation and tayloring, and
the Courts should defer to regulatory agencies following arguments of expertise in
determining the rules in regulated industries, to defend a role for state regulatory
agencies in cooperation with federal agencies. Weiser (2001) calls the 1996 Act as
«perhaps the most ambitious cooperative federalism venture to date.» However, the
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FCC failed to provide a clear vision of what should the content of the relationship
between state and federal regulation be.
Over the process of implementation of the 1996 Act, the entrants argued mostly
for state discretion on unbundling decisions, which is consistent with the view that
states favoured extensive unbundling of incumbents’ network elements. However, at
least in some occasions they also argued against state discretion on access pricing,
probably reflecting the wide variation in local loop and other network elements
prices that were set by the states. The FCC accepted a role for experimentation in
the unbundling or not of local sub- loops, before mandating a federal requirement to
unbundle them, in an example that an initial flexibility may recede when the federal
level learns and establishes that one approach is clearly superior. According to Teske
(2004) the model of local competition promoted by the Act was itself based on the
model of local competition experimented by the state of New York some years
earlier. Hoffinger (2003) explains that one of the entrants in local telephony, the
AT&T, was initially against a strong role for the states in unbundling decisions, but
changed its position after a new Chairman of the FCC (Michael Powell) signaled his
position against too much unbundling.
Nuechterlein and Weiser (2007), argue that with the advent of cellular telephony
or VOIP telephony, the regulatory role of the states will be very reduced, but will
still exist at least to monitor the reliability of emergency services (number 911 in the
US) and the efficacy of universal service programs. However, to the extent that
physical networks will still cross local territories, local powers will probably also
either claim a role, or be asked to provide a role, for example in providing
information for geographycally differentiate markets in broadband and to solve a
collective action problem so that operators can share the use of rights of way and
other physical infrastructure.
4. Determinants of broadband penetration: the role of local and regional
activism
4.1. Public support to broadband deployment
With the diffusion of Internet, technological change has made possible the
construcion of new generation networks that allow broadband access at very high
speeds. The commercial viability of these networks is not homogeneous, and there
are concerns that local communities will fall behind in the race to enjoy the benefits
from the new networks, in terms of business or personal communication,
entertainment, education or health. The intervention of local and regional powers to
try to accelerate the adoption of the new telecommunications networks has become
widespread. There are studies describing initiatives from the US (Gillett et al.,
2004). Nucciarelli et al. (2010) examine a number of cases of municipal activism in
Netherlands and Italy, highlighting the interaction of government and operators in
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Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). Ganuza and Viecens (2010) analyze the case of
Spanish regional initiatives and Catalonia’s in particular, as an example of an
initiative that has been allowed by the European Commission, given that it is
competitively neutral and open to partnerships with the public sector. 
Kolko (2010), shows that broadband deployment has a positive impact on local
employment levels (although causality is difficult to establish), but a clear impact on
wage rates and employment rates cannot be established. Reports from regulatory
agencies such as ARCEP (2008, 2010) in France, or OFCOM (2007) in the United
Kingdom have acknowledged the activism of local and regional powers and
established conditions under which these should be welcome. 
As explained in Section 2, both theory and empirical evidence suggest that there are
two broad types of public intervention in broadband Internet access markets: those
related to market power (regulation and antitrust or competition policy), and those
related to positive externalities (consumer network externalities or impact on overall
economic growth). In the United States the first type of intervention is carried out by the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and by the states; while in the European
Union by the European Commission and the National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs)
of the member states. The third package of European directives on telecommunications
currently under discussion proposes the creation of some sort of Pan-European
telecommunications regulator. Policies related to the promotion of broadband17 through
different combinations of subsidies and public investment («industrial policies») are
mainly carried out at decentralized levels both in the US18 and in Europe. This is in
contrast with countries that have achieved very high levels of broadband deployment,
such as South Korea and Japan, which have promoted for many years strong national
policies to promote broadband penetration (see Trillas 2008a).
Goolsbee (2002, 2006) points out that the high proportion of fixed costs relative
to total costs in firms providing broadband access implies that policies that subsidize
or reduce taxes for these operators are a key component of the relevant policy vector.
In the absence of these policies many territories could be left without access for a
long period of time, with important welfare losses in terms of consumer surplus and
other social benefits. Goolsbee and Guryan (2006), however, document that the
efficacy of subsidy programs to promote Internet access in the schools is not
accompanied by a better student performance. As the study of Kolko (2010)
mentioned above, this illustrates the difficulties of quantitatively establishing the
relationship between investment and welfare. 
Sand-Zantman et al., (2010), present a theoretical analysis of the interaction
between a national regulator, a national incumbent and a local power that can
compete with the incumbent using subsidies. The analysis focuses on when and
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17 SURIÑAC et al. (2006) summarize the potential benefits of broadband promotion in a number
of fields.
18 At least, until President Obama introduced the promotion of broadband in his 2009 fiscal
stimulus package.
under which conditions the local authority should be allowed to invest. With no
territorial externalities and no information problems, the local authority should be
allowed to invest. Externalities can arise for cost or for demand reasons. Under cost
externalities, the incumbent reduces average costs by investing in several
jurisdictions, something that the central authority should take into account when
deciding to allow or not local public investment. Demand externalities can be
positive or negative. They are negative if a very good network in one region causes
factors to migrate from a neighbouring region, and positive if a good network
enhances the value of the neighboring region’s network due to network externalities.
In these cases, whether to authorize local public investment and under which
conditions depends on the parameters of the model. When both the regulator and the
incumbent are uncertain of the costs of the local authority, then in some cases the
incumbent invests when the local authority also invests. To compensate the
incumbent for the risk of losing the fixed costs, the regulator must set very high
access prices, which is better to avoid by banning any risk of duplication.
Gómez-Barroso and Feijóo (2010), describe the evolution of the
telecommunications industry in terms of the diverse market failures that have
characterized it over time. For many decades, the main market failure that justified
public intervention in the industry was market power, and the stable government
architecture that addressed it fit with a stable technology and industry structure. With
the advent of the Internet and cellular telephony, though, other sources of insatisfaction
with market outcomes, such as network externalities, impact on economic
development, merit goods considerations or equity concerns, also characterize the
industry. This increasing complexity also raises uncertainty and learning problems,
triggering the need for a more administratively complex reaction from the public sector.
Regional and local initiatives better fit into the new cathegory of public interventions
described in Gómez-Barroso and Feijóo (2010) because they internalize policy
externalities better than specialized central powers, and precisely their lack of
specialization makes them good at dealing with multi-dimensional policies (Dixit,
2002). These initiatives also fit with the notion of industrial policy espoused by Rodrik
(2007), who argues that under conditions of policy and technological uncertainty, a
partnership between government and firms allow them to learn about the successful
projects. This partnership in learning is compatible with costly mistakes, but these
mistakes may under some conditions be a necessary by-product of a generally fruitful
strategy. Hauge el al. (2008) compare the initiatives of local powers in the US with the
entry of competitive local exchange companies (CLECS) and they conclude that the
former are of a different nature from the latter and are not incompatible with them.
4.2. Policy externalities, objectives and instruments
The fact that central powers are specialized in policy interventions that deal with
market power, but that local powers decide on market power and on other issues
simultaneously can be endogenized with a version of the Mulligan and Shleifer
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(2005) model of the political costs and benefits of specialized regulation. Using a
simplified version of this model, f (t) = (t + 1)–2 is the likelihood (based on a Pareto
distribution with shape parameter one) that a dispute is of type t (for example, the
complaint by a customer that a utility’s prices are too high), with higher t meaning
less frequent disputes, and hence higher t implying less likelihood that a dispute is
of type t. Then D(t) = bNf (t) is the total value (the «demand») of specialized
regulation for this type of disputes, where N is the total population potentially
affected by this type of disputes and b is the marginal value in the political market
of specifically regulating these disputes. Similarly, S(t) = ρ + ξNf(t) is the political
market cost function of specific regulation, where ρ is a fixed cost and ξ is a
marginal cost of regulating a dispute. A necessary condition for specific regulation
being desirable is b > ξ. Then there is a threshold value t = T* such that D(t) = S( t).
This threshold value is , and it is higher the higher the number of 
affected citizens relative to the fixed costs of regulation. We assume henceforth that
local powers are such that t > T* and that central powers are such that t ≤ T*. This
means that disputes between consumers and producers in network industries are not
worth of specific regulation in small jurisdictions and, hence, decisions concerning
these disputes are taken in fora where other policy issues are taken into account at
the same time.
As a consequence of the fixed costs of regulatory specialization, local powers
will have a more objectives than instruments (Tinbergen, 1952). From a static point
of view, this causes an inefficiency, as not all of the objectives will be fulfilled.
Incentives will be weaker as policy makers will have a variety of tasks and
objectives (Dixit, 2002). However, from a dynamic point of view these weaker
incentives ex post may yield stronger incentives for effort or investment ex ante
(Martimort, 1996).
This kind of «other» objectives that sometimes are expressed in vague terms give
high discretion to local policy makers, for example in the objective to protect the
«public interest» of state regulatory agencies that review mergers in the US.
The result is that central powers not always facilitate better commitment, and that
the other objectives of decentralized powers may act as a commitment device in the
presence of sunk investments. Although the argument has been made in a monopoly
setting, it is also clearly applicable in a context of access-based competition19,
where the network investment is carried out by the incumbent firm (see Trillas,
2008a) and the main regulatory instrument is the access price that entrants pay to the
incumbent. If a more inter-temporal perspective is taken, clearly the fact that the
other objectives of the local governments may change from time to time due to the
global policy environment introduces a difference source of volatility that may be
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19 This is the model of competition prevalent in the European Union. The incumbent is a vertically
integrated firm that operates in the wholesale market (as a regulated monopoly) and in the deregulated
retail market. And the entrants compete with the incumbent at the retail level using the incumbent’s
infrastructure. 
absent at the central level because of the more focused objective function at this
level. This would increase the costs of investment reducing the relative
attractiveness of the local regime.
More specifically, if the regulatory policy is the control of rights of way (this was
the policy instrument that inaugurated regulation at the local level in the nineteenth
century), then it is easy to see that the local powers will face a variety of (possibly
conflicting) objectives. For example, network competition may be facilitated if
different operators share the use of rights of way and other infrastructures
cooperatively. Then there is a trade-off between the negative externalities (and other
negative impacts on social welfare when competition is too costly) produced by too
much digging when the rights of way are not shared, and municipal revenues which
are maximized when different operators need different permits to dig the streets.
Local powers may help alleviate the collective action problem of the joint use of
physical infrastructures. But they also have incentives to promote non-cooperation,
to extract more rents from the operators. Which objective dominates remains an
empirical question.
Many sub-central jurisdictions (states, counties, municipalities) undertake
initiatives to promote broadband access. In some cases this is challenged by national
regulatory or antitrust authorities in Europe, but not in the US, where the state-action
doctrine tends to prevail (see Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997). Another important
difference is that the EU has state aid control rules in place, whereas such rules do
not exist in the US.
Treisman (2007), argues that when public investment (financed with taxes) in
infrastructure is a complement to private mobile capital, decentralized jurisdictions
may compete to attract capital by investing in infrastructure, and this may result in
a higher level of infrastructure provided the initial conditions in the local
jurisdictions are sufficiently homogeneous. Decentralization also makes it possible
to use existing institutions (so that fixed administrative costs do not have to be
duplicated) to differentiate regulation by geographic markets with different potential
for platform based competition. 
Of course, the final level of investment does not only depend on direct
government intervention but also on behavioural and structural regulation. In
particular, it depends on whether service based or facilities based competition is
encouraged, and, in the case of service based competition, on the level and other
features of access pricing. In Europe in particular, the strategy has been to encourage
what has been called the investment ladder, by which entrants are allowed to enter
initially at low access charges, to be encouraged subsequently to progressively build
their own infrastructure. 
4.3. The impact of decentralization on broadband
Based on the discussion in the preceding subsections, an a priori plausible
hypothesis is that broadband penetration Y (as a proxy for investment) is explained
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by centralization (C), variables that depend on regulatory decisions (R), and other
control variables (V):
Y = F (C, R, V) + ε
Montolio and Trillas (2010), estimate this equation for a panel of EU countries
and Table 2 reproduces the results (their original paper explores the potential
endogeneity of some regressors, with qualitatively identical results). 
The dependent variable Y is a measure of broadband penetration, that is, the
percentage of population with a broadband connection. Data to construct this
variable has been obtained from Point Topic Ltd. Global Broadband Statistics.
Two proxies are used to account for the effect of centralization/decentralization
on broadband penetration. The first variable is CENTRAL_REV and is calculated as
the share of total central government revenue with respect to total general (including
central, state and local) government revenue. Data is obtained from the OECD
National Accounts (Vol. IV-General Government Accounts). The second variable
used is ROW1 that is a dichotomous variable taking the value of 1 when rights of
way and digging permits over public land are granted by a single central authority
and 0 when rights of way are granted by local authorities. Data for this variable
comes from the EC Benchmark Reports.
Treisman (2007), among others, argues that it is important to use the relevant
notion of decentralization in specific contexts. In particular, it is important to
distinguish between administrative centralization and political centralization. In the
first case, as captured by our variable on central revenues, it is the volume of public
funds administered at the central versus the local levels what is measured, regardless
of whether local funds are administered or not by elected local policy makers. In the
second case, it is the degree to which policy making is carried out by democratically
and locally elected policy makers. Some countries may have administrative
decentralization without political decentralization. Similarly, some countries may be
very decentralized both in terms of taxation and expenditures and politically, but be
very centralized in terms of regulatory policies20. However, following Inman (2008)
political decentralization may be correlated with administrative decentralization
because politically elected local bodies are a commitment device for administrative
decentralization and policy differentiation. And Treisman (2006) confirms this by
finding that political federalism is positively correlated with the proportion of
decentralized over total country revenues or expenditures.
In our exercise, to the extent that public intervention in telecoms markets is
characterized by a multidimensional vector of policies, administrative centralization
as captured by the proportion of central revenues may be a proxy for the overall
degree of centralization of the relevant policies. However, to the extent that we focus
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20 In Spain, public spending is quite decentralized and there are local and regional strong
democratically elected authorities, but the regulation of airports, electricity, telecommunications and
(most of) railways and ports is central.
on specific elements of this vector, the location of the control of local rights of way
is the appropriate measure of centralization for this specific element.
Table 2 presents the results for the EU countries. In this case the centralization
of this type of policy (rights of way and digging permits) has a negative (as opposed
to positive in Distaso et al., 2006) but non significant impact on broadband
penetration. It seems that the ability of local powers to solve the collective action
problem of the joint use of physical infrastructures, and the concern for negative
externalities and social welfare, has not a lower weight than any short run concern
for maximizing confiscatory revenues. A conventional measure of overall
centralization has a negative impact on penetration, although this impact is only
significant in some of the regressions. 
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TABLE 2
FIXED EFFECTS PANEL ESTIMATIONS FOR EU COUNTRIES
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant -73.923 -134.20 -82.923 -74.944
Demographics (-3.87)*** (-6.42)*** (-3.70***) (-3.87***)
GDPpc 0.0006 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003(7.45)*** (4.28)*** (5.11)*** (4.06)***

















Row1 -1.755 -.- -.-(-1.40)
N 150 120 117 109
Countries 19 15 19 18
R2 within 0.6648 0.6983 0.6884 0.7593
NOTE: As regulatory variables (R) two type of variables are used. First, measures of the market
concentration. HH-INTER accounts for the degree of concentration across platforms (inter-
platform competition) and is calculated using the standard Herfindhal index. Data to construct
Herfindhal indices has been obtained from Point Topic Ltd. Global Broadband Statistics. Second,
we also use as proxies for regulatory policies measures accounting for unbundling regulation:
FULL_UNBUND is a dichotomous variable taking 1 when full unbundling is mandate (0
otherwise), obtained from the OECD (2003) Developments in local Loop Unbundling. As control
(demographic) variables we use GDP PER CAPITA in purchasing power parity terms (under the
assumption that broadband is a normal good) from the International Monetary Fund (robustness
checks have been performed with GDP per capita from the AMECO database from EUROSTAT).
Population DENSITY (under the assumption that more dense countries have a lower deployment
cost) is obtained as population per squared kilometre (from IMF databases).
5. Concluding remarks 
• Decisions about the optimal allocation of public responsibilities on
telecommunications in the vertical chain of government face an old dilemma
between scale economies and network externalities, on the one hand, and
management of rights of way, on the other. Whereas the optimal scale of a
telecommunications network can be very large, its deployment naturally needs the
involvement of local powers. 
• The liberalization of telecommunications and technological change have
unbundled a vector of public interventions in this industry. Different elements of this
vector (competition policy, regulation of residual monopolies, public investment)
have different geographic scope. Prior to these phenomena, all public intervention
took place over many decades through the national regulation or public ownership
of vertically integrated monopolies. Now different government levels interact. The
need for vertical and horizontal policy cooperation (mentioned in the seminal
contribution by Baron, 1985) then arises in network industries. Administrative costs
and distributional concerns, however, make inter-jurisdictional cooperation difficult.
• There is a trade-off between the different spillovers internalized by each level
of government: centralization internalizes territorial spillovers, and decentralization
better internalizes policy spillovers, due to the fixed costs of regulatory
specialization causing a mismatch between objectives and instruments. As a result,
an empirical prediction is that the impact of decentralization on network extension
is ambiguous. Preliminary evidence does not solve this ambiguity but provides weak
results in favour of some role for local and regional powers.
• Harmonization has made more progress in the European Union in
telecommunications than in other industries such as electricity, although the
potentially competitive nature of all telecommunications markets and the need for
flexibility due to rapidly changing technology make regulatory harmonization in
telecoms less necessary than in these other markets. One could be tempted to argue
that since some telecommunications markets are more and more inter-jurisdictional
(as a matter of fact, more and more global) in nature, due to technology, regulation
and policy intervention should also cease to be local, regional or even national.
However, long distance communications or backbone Internet networks are also
potentially competitive in nature, much more than local communications.
Regulation in telecommunications is more and more relegated to local access and
the bottlenecks are local. Notice the difference with electricity markets, where long
distance transmission is a natural monopoly that must be regulated at the highest
possible level.
• Deregulation in the US and Europe has required federal (central) initiatives
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because entrenched monopolies are sub-federal, but this does not necessarily imply
that any remaining policy intervention should be at the central level. Even in a
competitive telecommunications sector with more integrated markets, the scope for
national or regional/local policies will not disappear. The arguments developed in
this paper suggest that the case for national and sub-national (instead of central or
federal) public action in the EU is strongest when:
iii) policy intervention is about a good or market that is geographically local in
nature, with few or non-significant spillovers (e.g. local access), or when
sound regulatory decision-making requires considerable knowledge of local
conditions (e.g. on policies towards areas not served by rural broadband);
iii) regulatory controversies are so numerous or time consuming as to be beyond
the resources at the EU Federal level, or member state financial participation
would advance a costly federal objective. 
iii) state or regional/local enforcement of existing federal or state standards
produces better results for retail or wholesale consumers. For instance, lower
government levels are often the first point of contact for consumer
complaints, and typically offer quicker and more effective responses to such
complaints.
iv) local powers may participate in efforts to achieve regulatory geographic
differentiation, including in some areas the possibility of direct competitively
neutral investments, perhaps in partnership with the private sector.
Differentiated regulation and geographically tailored policies may be needed,
for the reasons that have been given for a long time by the literature on fiscal
federalism: mainly to take into account differences in collective preferences,
costs and consumer demand, and to promote policy experimentation in the
face of uncertainty. There is often a need to respond to new problems where
a single federal policy would be premature. Some territories may undertake
experimentation with regulatory or competitive strategies that have not
achieved a general consensus, such as functional vertical separation or
others. This uncertainty may be due to technological or demand unknowns or
to experts disagreeing on what is the best policy option. For example, in
broadband markets, scholars hold different opinions21 on what is the best
way to promote competition, either through facilities based vertically
integrated rivalry, or through a «ladder of investment» by which entrants are
initially helped by regulators to use the infrastructure of the incumbent, and
are progressively encouraged to build their own infrastructure.
v) local powers may help alleviate the collective action problem of managing
the rights of way and physical infrastructures common to competing
networks. 
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21 See TRILLAS (2008a) for a summary of this controversy.
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• All of these suggest a continuing role for regional and local policies, even if
overall EU frameworks are likely to be set centrally. The trend in Europe has been
until recently to strengthen the regulatory role of the European Commission, and to
create national (member state) independent regulatory agencies, without much
consideration for the need to accommodate some role of local or regional powers
and to take into account the coordination between regulation and other policies.
Europe seems to be trying to internalize network externalities through progressively
more centralized regulation, whereas in the US geographical externalities are being
internalized through large national (thus, in the US, continental) firms22 that
compete in a variety of product and geographic markets.
• Decentralization (at the state or member state level) is better at providing
commitment for investment than at accommodating market reforms. But
decentralization and the creation of a common internal market are clearly
compatible. The largest and most successful internal market in historical terms (the
US) is substantially decentralized. The federal level should focus on policing well
functioning and integrated markets, but it should delegate (in a framework of
vertical cooperation when necessary) most residual behavioural regulation to lower
level governments. Applying this perspective, the EU should focus its own scarce
central resources and political capital in an increased effort towards market
integration. Although compliance costs and the entrenchment of national
incumbents are important arguments to take into account in reaching some effective
level of harmonization, the subsidiarity principle of the Maastricht Treaty suggest
that unless there are significant externalities and scale economies, regulation should
be performed at the lowest levels. Further, these externalities and scale economies
should not be taken as given for all time, but should be restricted to those that result
from structural market conditions. Hence, the focus for EU policy in this area should
be on removing all legal barriers that at the moment prevent the existence of markets
with the optimal geographic scope. 
• The on-going debate in Europe should consider more seriously some forms of
cooperation that are well supported by theory and experience as shown in the
relevant literature. This includes:
– Regulatory specialization: Taking into account the fixed costs of regulation
(Mulligan and Shleifer, 2005), some national regulators could, for instance,
specialize in spectrum issues and others in network interconnections. Similarly,
other authorities could delegate at least the analysis prior to decisions to these
more specialized bodies.
22 The role of firms as subeconomies where some externalities are internalized is addressed in
HOLMSTROM (1999).
– Temporary regulatory experimentation: Delegation to regional and local levels
could, for example, be very useful in developing next generation networks in
broadband, where even the best experts often disagree on the optimal balance
between facilities based and access based competition.
– Cooperative solutions (or clarification of its illegitimacy in some cases) for the
«other objectives» that often pervade local or national decision making: Some
degree of delegation within a central perspective could be helpful in resolving
the sometimes major policy difficulties that arise in, for example, attitudes to
‘national champion companies’, universal service definitions, etc.
– Local input in geographic differentiation or in solving collective action
problems of the joint use of physical infrastructures: for example also in the
deployment of next generation broadband networks.
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